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RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION BY JUDGMENT:
THE LAW APPLIED IN FEDERAL COURTS
Allan D. Vestal*

!.

INTRODUCTION

judicata/preclusion by judgment is an important principle
of judicial administration. In both of its aspects-issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion (bar and merger)1
-the principle is used to achieve certain socially desirable ends. 2
First, it protects litigants from harassment through the litigation
of the same claim or issue. Second, the principle helps to preserve
the prestige of the courts by avoiding inconsistent judgments; having the same issue decided in different ways can only undermine
the general public's esteem for the legal system. A third end served
by preclusion by judgment is the saving of the courts' time by avoiding repetition of litigation. If there were no such principle as preclusion by judgment, some litigants might relitigate matters several
times. 3 Losing plaintiffs might bring additional suits on the same
causes of action in the hope of finding a court or jury which would
decide in their favor; even winning plaintiffs might sue a second
time hoping to get larger recoveries. Parties losing on a fact issue
in one suit could relitigate the matter in any subsequent suit. Without a doubt, our presently overloaded courts would find themselves
swamped with additional litigation of highly questionable value.
This, it would seem, is a very important justification for the principle of preclusion of judgment.
There has been a great increase in the use of the principle of
res judicata/preclusion in the federal courts. Although it is difficult
to document a statement such as this, one who has done a great deal
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• John F, Murray Professor of Law, University of Iowa. A.B. 1943, DePauw
University; LL.B. 1949, Yale University.-Ed.
1. Res judicata/preclusion is a generic term which encompasses both claim pre•
clusion/bar and merger and issue preclusion/collateral estoppel. For examples of the
use of this terminology, see Towle v. Boeing Airplane Co., 364 F.2d 590 (8th Cir.
1966); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), afj'd
mb nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912
(1967); Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 153 N.W.2d 849 (1967); Clark
v. Clark, 80 Nev. 52, 389 P.2d 69 (1964).
2. See Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 29 (1964).
3. Examples of this desire to relitigate are easy to find and many liti~ts today
attempt to relitigate claims and issues even though we do have the doctrine of preclusion. See, e.g., Fiumara v. Sinclair Refining Co., 385 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1967):
Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 919 (1966); Heasley
v. United States, 348 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1965).
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of research in the area senses that more litigants and courts are
recognizing the availability of res judicata/preclusion to reach certain ends which the courts accept as socially desirable. However,
the development of the scope of the principle is more easily documented. The extension of preclusion from criminal to civil litigation
is one example of this. 4 The breakdown in the requirement of
mutuality is another, allowing a party to claim preclusive effect
even though he was not a party to the first suit. 5 The expansion
of the scope of the definition of "claim" in connection with bar and
merger/claim preclusion might also be considered an expansion of
the scope of preclusion.6
All of these developments, it is suggested, result from a felt need
on the part of the courts. Judges, overwhelmed by docket loads, are
looking for devices to expedite their work. Preclusion offers an
opportunity to eliminate litigation which is not necessary or desirable. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the use of preclusion will increase as does the docket load of the courts. Finally, if
preclusion/res judicata is a desirable principle, and it seems to be,
the federal courts should be at the forefront in establishing and
promoting it. In fact, an examination of recent federal cases seems
to support the idea that federal courts are leading the way in the
use and development of preclusion by judgment.7

II.

THE

LAw OF PRECLUSION IN FEDERAL CouRTS
A. Problem

Preclusion is not a simple principle; it is a multifaceted concept
affected by a number of relevant variables. A discussion of the principles is meaningful only if specific situations are discussed; to talk in
generalities is not profitable. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, this
Article will consider several typical situations.
Example A. Judgment is rendered in forum I in a case between
4. See Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1001 (1967); Vestal 8: Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal
Prosecutions, 19 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1966).
5. See United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D.
Nev. 1962), afj'd sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 3!15 F.2d !!79 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50
IowA L. REv. 27 (1964).
6. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62 Nw.
U.L. REv. 357 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 885
U.S. 1001 (1967); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash.,
D. Nev. 1962), afj'd sub nom., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 835 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Mathews v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 193
F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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X and Y, with a fact adjudication necessary for the decision against
Y. In forum II there is subsequent litigation between Y and Z, and
the question arises whether Z can assert the earlier fact adjudication
against Y as preclusive on that issue. If forum I and forum II are

state courts, certain considerations deserve attention; if either forum
is a federal court, however, there are other elements which may be
pertinent.
It must be recognized that the law may vary on this problem.
At the present time one jurisdiction may require mutuality of preclusion. Another may say that the losing party, Y, is bound by the
adjudication since he has had the opportunity and the incentive to
litigate in the first action. 8
Example B. Forum I has a rather narrow definition of "cause of
action." In an automobile accident suit, it holds that the plaintiff
has two causes of action: one for personal injuries and the other
for property damages.9 Suppose that X sues Y in forum I for personal
injury and recovers a judgment. If X then sues Y in forum II for
property damages, what law will be applied to Y's assertion of claim
preclusion? Could forum II apply its own definition of "claim" when
the definition is broad enough to encompass both personal injury
and property damages? Could forum II decide that res judicata/
claim preclusion applies? What law should be applied in forum II
if it is a federal court? These questions are part of the problem being
considered.10 It also must be understood that example A is one of
8. For cases repudiating the doctrine of "mutuality," see Adriaanse v. United States,
184 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932 (1951); Bruszewski v. United
States, 181 F.2d 419; United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash.,
D. Nev. 1962), affd sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942).
See also Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D. Mass. 1960),
where the court stated:
[I]nquiries should be made as to whether plaintiff had a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his claim the first time •
• • • He has had his day in court on the issue in a forum of his own choosing
and against a party of his own choosing who was closely related to the present
defendant.
9. A minority of states adhere to the rule that damage to goods and injury to the
person, although the result of the same act, are infringements of different rights, and
give rise to two causes of action. See, e.g., Clancey v. McBride, 338 Ill. 35, 169 N.E. 729
(1929): Smith v. Fischer Baking Co., 105 N.J. 567, 147 A. 455 (1929).
IO. The possible situations may be charted as follows:
Subject Matter
Jurisdiction of
Forum I
Forum II
Forum II
I. Federal Court
Federal Court
Federal Question
2. State Court
Federal Court
Federal Question
3. Federal Court
Federal Court
Diversity
4. State Court
Federal Court
Diversity
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issue preclusion while example Bis one of claim preclusion. 11 These
are separate and distinct legal concepts, although they are grouped
together for the purpose of discussion under some circumstances.
At this point, it is also helpful to identify other significant variables in the situations under consideration. These variables are (I) the
court handing down the judgment which is supposedly preclusive,
and (2) the subject-matter jurisdiction of the forum II federal court.
These two factors, along with the claim-issue dichotomy, are elements
which must be considered in determining the law to be applied in
preclusion cases in the federal courts.

B. Possible Sources of Applicable Law
A federal court faced with an assertion of preclusion arising from
an earlier decision must consider a number of different possible
sources of law and relevant variables before a final conclusion is
reached. First, the concept of full faith and credit as found in the
federal Constitution and the implementing federal statute must be
considered.12 Second, in cases involving nonfederal subject-matter
jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine and its ramifications need to be examined to see whether resort must be had to the law of the state in
which the federal court is sitting.13 Third, the interest of the federal
court system in the adjudication must be considered, since under
the principle of Hanna v. Plumer, and possibly other rationales, the
federal interest is a factor which may affect the law to be applied. 14
An examination of the federal court decisions on preclusion
reveals that there is a lack of consistency or rationality in the law
being applied. Courts often present different principles as applicable;15 some present no justification, in terms of the source of the law
11. For a good discussion of res judicata/claim preclusion by Judge Goodrich, see
Williamson v. Columbia Gas &: Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 921 (1951).
12. See notes 41-59 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 23-40 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 62-82 infra and accompanying text. This balancing is similar to the
current trend in conflicts-of-laws cases which hold it approP,riate to consider the possible impact or the law "of the place which is most significantly related to the occurrence or issue before the Court." H. GOODRICH &: E. SCOLES, CoNFUCT OF LAws 165
(4th ed. 1964).
15. Compare Gramm v. Lincoln, 257 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1958) and Friedenthal v.
Williams, 271 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) with Kem v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333 (2d
Cir. 1962) and Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868
(1st Cir. 1960).
For an example of an unusual rationale, see Newport News Ship. &: Drydock Co. v.
Seaboard Maritime Corp., 174 F. Supp. 446, 468 (D. Del. 1958). The court, in deciding
the impact of a judgment rendered by a federal court, stated, "It would therefore
appear that pleading the Florida judgment ceases to be a matter solely of res judicata
but also one of enforceability and effect to be accorded a foreign judgment." The
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being applied, for the conclusion reached; 16 and, some courts recognize the problem but refuse to face up to it. The latter approach
is typified by the courts which indicate that they are uncertain about
the source of the law applicable-whether one state or another or
the federal law-but conclude that it makes no difference since
the various laws are all the same.17
In part, this lack of consistency or rationality is due to a failure
on the part of attorneys to recognize the complex choice-of-law
problems involved. In a discussion of the full faith and credit
clause, which is part of the total picture being considered, Justice
Jackson remarked: "The practicing lawyer often neglects to raise
questions under it, and judges not infrequently decide cases to which
it would apply without mention of it."18 Furthermore, according to
Justice Jackson, full faith and credit problems are difficult to resolve
even when they are properly raised:
Indeed, I think it difficult to point to any field in which the Court
has more completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the
lack of guiding standards of a legal character than in trying to determine what choice of law is required by the Constitution.19
Court then looked to see what a Delaware court would do in the situation and how
it would treat the "foreign" interstate judgment. No reference was made to full
faith and credit, and the court specifically limited federal court recognition of a federal
judgment because the federal courts "are many members but one body" to cases involving "matters peculiarly cognizable in a Federal forum." 174 F. Supp. at 468 n.8.
16, See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal &: Mining Co., 356 F.2d 979 (10th Cir.)
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 919, rehearing denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966). Rhodes v. Jones,
351 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1965); Mathews v. New York Racing Ass'n, 193 F. Supp. 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
17. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp.
298 (D. Md. 1967) (suit under the Federal Torts Claims Act). The Capital Airlines
court stated, "[l]t is not necessary for this court to determine this conflict of laws
question because the law of the District of Columbia and the law of the State of
Maryland on the issue of mutuality is the same." 267 F. Supp. at 303. In Sherman
v. Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court stated:
In determining the effect to be given the Iowa judgment, neither party has
explicitly considered the conflicts question of what law is applicable. Some of the
conflicts problems lurking in the record are formidable in the abstract; i.e., does
New York law, Iowa law or federal law apply in resolving each of the three issues
stated above? , • . However, resolution of the choice of law question is not
crucial because there do not appear to be material differences between the Iowa,
New York, or federal decisions affecting the issues raised here. [Footnotes omitted.]
See also Rohm &: Haas Co. v. Chemical Insecticide Corp., 171 F. Supp. 426, 430 (D. Del.
1959), where the court stated:
It is to be hoped that if the res judicata defense is again advanced, the parties
will be prepared to supply the Court with their views on the questioq of the
applicability of state as against federal law as it related to the privity question.
Tliis is the "interesting intellectual question" which was posed in Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co .•••
18. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
CoLUM. L. REv. 1, !I (1945).
19. Id. at 16.
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Similar confusion exists as to the impact of the Erie doctrine, and
an examination of cases decided in the federal courts within the past
several decades shows that, in nonfederal cases, a sizeable number
of courts did not mention Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins or obviously apply state law. On the other hand, a number of cases did
mention the possible application of the concept of full faith and
credit, either constitutional or statutory.
These considerations may tend to pull in different directions. On
the one hand, Erie considerations, such as avoidance of forum shopping and affording equal treatment to litigants,20 may suggest that
state law is controlling and that a federal court should be required to
resort to the law of the state in which it is sitting to get an answer
concerning a claim of preclusion. On the other hand, full faith and
credit considerations may suggest a direct reference to the law of the
forum handing down the first, or precluding, judgment.21 In a more
indirect and historical sense, the full faith and credit concept should
be recognized as an attempt to integrate and unify the country. Its
application in the federal courts should be consistent with this underlying goal. The distinct federal interests in actions being adjudicated
in federal courts might suggest the creation of a federal law of preclusion/res judicata. If the law to be applied is that of the place
"which is most significantly related to the . . . issue before the
court,"22 this might well suggest the application, in the area of preclusion, of a federal body of law. This is simply,to say that when the
technicalities of the law are examined, the underlying principles
should not be forgotten. The ultimate decision should reflect the
underlying interests of society.
C. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and State Law
When preclusion by judgment is asserted in a federal court
exercising nonfederal subject-matter jurisdiction,23 it may be urged
that the federal court is required to apply the law of the state in
which it is sitting because of the Erie doctrine. Under that doctrine,
as developed in the decade following its promulgation, a federal court
20. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
21. Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., Inc., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953), suggests the pos•
sibility of conflict between the Erie doctrine and full faith and credit; dissenting Judge
Martin would find the constitutional full faith and credit controlling in that situation.
This case did not involve preclusion by judgment.
22. H. GoonrucH & E. ScoLES, supra note 14, at 165. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
23. Erie is not limited to diversity cases. See. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat1
Bank, 306 U.S. 103 (1939); Vestal, Erie. R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L.
REV. 248, 257 (1963).
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was required to follow the law of the state in which it was sitting in
any matter which might "significantly affect" the outcome of the
litigation.24 Although this articulation of law applicable to nonfederal matter was generally accepted for a long time, it was not
precisely accurate.211 Moreover, within the last decade the Supreme
Court has rendered several decisions which have indicated a movement away from the absolutism of Erie and Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 26 toward a more reasonable middle ground where the significant considerations-both federal and state-are weighed before a
decision is made concerning the law to be applied. Actually, this
recent development should be recognized as a shift in emphasis; the
contrapuntal nature of the interplay has been present since the Erie
decision. 27 Once a transition is made from abstract consideration of
the generic Erie rule to a specific consideration of its possible application in a preclusion case in a federal court, difficulties are encountered. Immediately, one recognizes that the countervailing
federal considerations must be weighed and that there are other
relevant factors which must be noted.
The possible application of the Erie doctrine in a preclusion case
can arise in a federal court, forum II, regardless of whether forum I
was a state or federal court. The Erie doctrine is invoked because of
the nonfederal subject-matter jurisdictional base of the federal
court, forum II. The Erie problem can also arise whether there is a
single state involved or several states. Obviously, if there is only a
single state involved, there will be no interstate conflicts problem and
no full faith and credit difficulty in possibly not giving the proper
effect to a foreign judgment. In Heiser v. Woodruff, 28 the Supreme
Court of the United States skirted the issue of the possible application of Erie to questions of preclusion, stating:
We need not consider whether, apart from the requirements of
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, the rule of res
judicata applied in the federal courts, in diversity of citizenship
cases, under the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ... can be
other than that of the state in which the federal court sits.20
24. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, !126 U.S. 99, rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 806
(1945); see also Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &: Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 839 (1949).
25. See Sibbach v. Wilson &: Co., lH2 U.S. 1 (1941), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 655
(1941).
26. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 806 (1945).
27. See Hanna v. Plumer, !180 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 9!13 (1958); Vestal, supra
note 2!1, at 48.
28. !127 U.S. 726 (1946), rehearing denied, 328 U.S. 879 (1946).
29. !127 U.S. at 7!11•!12.
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Some lower federal courts, however, when faced with claims of preclusion in diversity cases, have referred to the Erie doctrine and have
applied it. In Gramm v. Lincoln,30 for example, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit indicated that an earlier decision by a state
court precluded a second state court proceeding seeking "the same
relief on the same ground." From this proposition, the Court of Appeals reasoned that "the federal district court is also precluded from
relitigating that question." In a footnote the court stated that "since
this is a diversity case, the federal court is required to follow the law
of the state .... This includes the law pertaining to res judicata."31
Gramm involved the estate of a decedent who had died in Idaho. The
first suit had been in an Idaho court and the federal court hearing
the second suit was also sitting in Idaho. It also should be noted that
the case involved claim preclusion rather than issue preclusion.
The Erie doctrine was applied to a question of issue preclusion
in Friedenthal v. Williams,32 where the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana was faced with a diversity suit brought
by a spouse-passenger in one car against the driver of a second car.
The spouse-driver had brought an earlier action against the driver of
the second car claiming negligence in the same accident, and judgment had been rendered for the defendant. In the federal court the
defendent asserted that the action was barred by "res judicata and/or
judicial estoppel," and to resolve this issue the federal court applied
Louisiana law. Here the accident happened in the same state in
which were sitting both the state court hearing the first suit and
the federal court hearing the second suit. There was no conflicts
problem.
It might be urged persuasively that when a federal court is
acting simply as another court of a state, as in Gramm and
Friedenthal, and when no other state has an interest in the litigation,
it is reasonable for the federal court to apply the preclusion law
of the state in which it is sitting.33 When two or more states have an
30. 257 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1958).
31. 257 F.2d at 255 &: n.6.
32. 271 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
33. See McConnell v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 346 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1965); Boulter
v. Commercial Standards Ins. Co., 175 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1949); Hornstein v. Kramer
Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1943); Deaton v. Gay Trucking Co., 275
F. Supp. 750 (D.S.C. 1967); Forrester v. Southern Ry. Co., 268 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ga.
1967); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Mileer, 264 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1967); Hassenplug v.
Victor Lynn Lines, 71 F. Supp. 70, 71 (E.D. Pa. 1947):
The question of whether the rule of res judicata applied in the federal courts,
in diversity of citizenship cases, under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ••• can be other
than that of the state in which the federal court sits was specifically left open in
Heiser v. Woodruff. • •. To do otherwise than apply Pennsylvania law in this
situation would be anomalous. The former judgment relied upon by defendant
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interest in a diversity case, however, some federal courts have applied-or at least paid deference to-the Erie doctrine. 84 But it
might be argued that when the federal court is acting truly as a federal court, resolving conflicting interests among several states, there
is some justification for a different approach to the question of what
law of preclusion should be applied. An example of this situation is
Wayside Transportation Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express,35 wherein
forum I was a state court in Vermont. In a subsequent diversity
action in the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
it was urged that the Vermont judgment was preclusive on the issue
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the Vermont court.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided that the first
judgment was preclusive and stated:
The constitutional and statutory provisions requiring full faith and
credit articulate and implement the dictate of public policy "that
there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue
shall be bound by the result of the contest; and that matters once
tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties." .•.
And the principle that there shall be but one adjudication of an issue
between the same parties covers the issue of jurisdiction over a defendant's person, provided the court first deciding that issue, in this
case the Vermont court, did not make so gross a mistake as to be
impossible "in a rational administration of justice.'' . . . From our
was obtained in a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania. The court, for the substantive issues of that case, was sitting as a state court, when it rendered its judgment.•.• Certainly Pennsylvania law should now be used to determine the effect
of that judgment in a case in the same state, where federal jurisdiction is once
again based on diversity.
Cf. Mathews v. New York Racing Ass'n, 193 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Both suits
were in the same federal court; both claims arose in New York; neither judge mentioned state law or cited state cases. But see the pair of cases: Reiser v. Baltimore &:
O.R.R., 12!1 F. Supp. 44 (1954), and Koblitz V. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 164 F. Supp. 367
(S.D.N,Y. 1958). Both suits were in federal courts; there was diversity jurisdiction but
no reference to Erie.
Although the precise holding of Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) (a 5-4 decision), is not clear, the Court referred to the federal district court as "another North
Carolina court, albeit a federal court." The Supreme Court, nonetheless, seemed to adhere to the idea that it was applying a general principle of law on the res judicata
question. The important consideration seemed to be the federal interest in avoiding a
conflict with the state,
34. See, e.g., Behrens v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
821 (1949); Schmitt v. Jacobson, 272 F. Supp. 301 (D. Mass. 1967) (reference to Massachusetts law and "the trend of judicial decision generally in this area of the law'');
Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960) (reference to law of
state in which the court was sitting, no controlling case found, invocation of an expanding concept of collateral estoppel, holding of preclusion); Newport News Ship. &:
Drydock Co. v. Seaboard Maritime Corp., 174 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1958) (Delaware
conflict-of-laws rules followed to apply Florida law on effect of judgment of that
state).
!15. 284 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1960),
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statement of the case we think it too clear for discussion that the
Vermont court made no outrageous mistake in applying its own law.
This being so, its judgment is res judicata under established principles of federal law.86
It is noteworthy that the court of appeals nowhere spoke of the Erie
case or of how a Massachusetts state court would decide the problem.
Apparently the First Circuit felt that the applicable law of preclusion was to be found other than in the substantive law of the state
in which the federal trial court was sitting.
The problem of Erie's applicability was treated more directly by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kern v. Hettinger, 81
a diversity case involving claim preclusion. Forum I, the Federal District Court for the N orthem District of California, had entered a dismissal for lack of prosecution. When the plaintiff attempted to sue on
the same claim in New York, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted summary judgment dismissing his
complaint as to several defendants.88 On appeal, the Second Circuit
held that the suit was precluded by the judgment in the California
federal district court. In response to the plaintiff's contention that
California law controlled the effect of the judgment in forum I and
that under California law a dismissal for lack of prosecution would
be without prejudice, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated:
One of the strongest policies a court can have is that of determining the scope of its own judgments. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc. . . . It would be destructive of the basic
principles of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to say that the
effect of a judgment of a federal court was governed by the law of
the state where the court sits simply because the source of federal
jurisdiction is diversity. The rights and obligations of the parties
are fixed by state law. These may be created, modified and enforced
by the state acting through its own judicial establishment. But we
think it would be strange doctrine to allow a state to nullify the
judgments of federal courts constitutionally established and given
power also to enforce state created rights. The Erie doctrine .
is not applicable here ....39
36. 284 F.2d at 871.
37. 303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962). It is interesting to note that in this same case, the
court considered the claim of collateral estoppel made by a second defendant who had
not been served and who had not appeared in the California suit. The court stated at
340, "Regardless of which law we turn to to decide this question, the result is the
same," and then referred to California and New York cases. This would suggest that
at this point state law might be applicable.
38. 303 F.2d at 334.
39. 303 F .2d at 340.
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Consideration of these and other recently decided federal cases
on preclusion in which jurisdiction was based on diversity seems to
suggest that there is no uniformity of judicial attitude toward the
Erie doctrine. Certainly there are a number of cases which have
implicitly or explicitly rejected the doctrine in favor of a more
general principle of federal law regarding preclusion. This approach
seems consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v.
Plumer, 40 which indicates that it is necessary to consider the principles underlying Erie in deciding whether state or federal law should
be applied. When preclusion is examined from this point of view,
it can be decided whether the Erie rationale requires that the federal
courts follow the law of the state. It can also be determined whether
the possibility of forum shopping and inequitable treatment of litigants forecloses the use of different laws by federal and state courts of
the same jurisdiction. Along with these factors, the federal courts
should balance other considerations-such as the concept of full faith
and credit and the nature of any countervailing federal interests-in
determining from what source the law concerning preclusion is to
be drawn.

D. Full Faith and Credit
When the Constitution of the United States was adopted, one
of the underlying motivations of its Framers was the economic and
political integration of the country.
By the full faith and credit clause [the founding fathers] sought
to federalize the separate and independent state legal systems by the
overriding principle of reciprocal recognition of public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings. It was placed foremost among those measures which would guard the new political and economic union
against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence ....41
Whenever the impact of the full faith and credit concept is examined
it is necessary to consider the goal which this provision sought to
attain. The constitutional "full faith and credit" provision, found
in article IV, states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." 42
40. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
41. Jackson, supra note 18, at 17 (footnote omitted). For an excellent discussion of
the background of the full faith and credit clause, see Radin, The Authenticated
Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REv. I (1944).
42. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1.
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There is little doubt that this clause applies solely to the courts
of the states; it directs the state courts to recognize-give full faith
and credit-to decisions of other state courts. The constitutional
provision thus has no effect in the federal courts of the United
States. 43 However, supplementing the constitutional provision is
section 1738 of the Judicial Code, which is broader in scope.44
The direction of this statutory provision is given not just to the
courts of the states, but rather to "every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions," which would seem to
include the federal c;ourts. It instructs the second court to give judgments "the same full faith and credit . . . as they have . . . in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken."
In applying the constitutional clause and implementing statute
to questions of preclusion in federal courts, two situations must be
considered. The first involves a state court judgment which is later
drawn into question in a second proceeding in a federal court. The
statutory provision, on its face, would seem to apply to this situation.45 The second possibility arises when a federal court hands
43. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Wayside
Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1960).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) provides:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
The language of the statutory provision is not that of the Constitution, but there is
no reason to believe that a difference in application was intended by the difference in
the language.
Congress first effectuated the full faith and credit clause by the act of May 26,
1790, I Stat. 22. This act provided that authenticated records, judicial proceedings and
acts should have "such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United
States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said
records are or shall be taken." This initial act did not include the territories, but "[o]n
March 27, 1804, Congress passed an act extending the provisions of the former statute
to the public acts, records, judicial proceedings, etc., of the territories of the United
States and countries subject to the jurisdiction thereof. 2 Stat. 298, ch. 56." Atchison,
Topeka &: Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 64 (1909).
In 1948 Congress changed the language, concerning the effect of authenticated acts,
records, and judicial proceedings in other jurisdictions, from "such faith and credit"
as given them in the rendering jurisdiction. However, no indication is found in the
Revisor's notes that the change in language had any significance. 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1966).
45. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.
156, 166 (1932); Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868
(1st Cir. 1960); United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
825 (1948). But see Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959) (no mention made of full faith and credit; apparently federal law
of res judicata applied); Behrens v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 821 (1949) (applied Erie and conflict-of-laws rules rather than full faith and
credit; referred to forum law); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954)
(no mention of full faith and credit; apparently federal law of res judicata applied).
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down a judgment which is then drawn into question in a subsequent
proceeding in another federal court-46 In this situation it may also be
argued that the statutory provision applies. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit was faced with the latter situation in Caterpillar Tractor Go. v. International Harvester Co.,41 and concluded
that:
[T]he federal statute requires faith and credit "in every court
within the United States." The credit which this judgment must
receive is that to which it is entitled "by law or usage" in the courts
of the place where rendered. That is a matter of the common law of
[the state where the federal court sat], but is a matter which has not,
so far as we have been able to find, been dealt with by [such] courts.
In the absence of contrary local decisions the rules [of preclusion]
set out above are the ones we believe to be sound and to which we
give our approval.4 8

It is to be noted that the court, in fact, went on to make its own
decision about the weight to which the prior judgment was entitled.
Moreover, the language concerning full faith and credit loses much
of its force in light of the following discussion in the opinion:
On the other hand, the matter here is one between two courts
of the same sovereignty, the United States of America. If one federal
court failed to give effect to the judgment of another federal court
the Supreme Court of the United States, as the head of the judicial
system of the United States, would compel it to do so because "they
are many members yet but one body." . . .
Whichever route one travels he reaches the same destination....
Judge Biggs believes that the problem discussed in the preceding
paragraphs presents no problem of faith and credit and that the
recognition in one federal court of the decrees of another comes
through the fact that both courts are arms of the same sovereignty.49
46. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
Another possibility, which is not within the ambit of this Article, involves a federal judgment which was handed down and then was drawn into question in a subsequent proceeding in a state court. The constitutional provision would not cover
this, but the possible application of the statutory provision is apparent. This is very
close to the example given in the text of federal first and then federal second. If the
statute, contrary to its apparent language, applies to a federal judgment handed
down, it would not seem to matter whether the second proceeding is in a federal or
state court since the statute refers to "every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions." Compare Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30 (1924);
Hancock Nat'! Banlc v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3
(1882); In re Bailleaux, 47 Cal. 2d 258, 302 P.2d 801 (1956), cert denied, 353 U.S. 975
(1957); and Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission, 176 S. 2d 692 (Ct. App. La. 1965)
with Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165, rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 675 (1938); Superior
Distributing Corp., v. White, 146 Colo. 595, 362 P.2d 196 (1961); and Gunsberg v.
Cantor, 24 App. Div. 2d 999, 220 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1965), motion for
leave to appeal denied, 18 N.Y.2d 711, 220 N.E.2d, 274, N.Y.S.2d 148 (1966).
47. 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941).
48. 120 F.2d at 85-86 (footnote omitted).
49. 120 F.2d at 86.
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The full faith and credit argument concerning the applicable law
in the federal courts can be understood only if it is recognized that
the content of the preclusion law of the court handing down the
judgment which is supposedly preclusive is a significant variable. In
considering possible preclusive effect, there are three possibilities
which might occur. First, the law concerning preclusion might be
the same in both jurisdictions, in which case the court in forum II
is not forced to make any decision concerning the source of the law;
it simply applies the law, perhaps noting in passing that the law
is the same. 50 Second, the law of preclusion in forum II may be
narrower in scope than that of forum I: forum I might hold for
preclusion while forum II would not. Given these facts, the full
faith and credit concept would be undermined if forum II applied
its own standards, since the forum I judgment is being given lesser
effect in forum II than it would have received in forum I. The full
faith and credit concept requires the judgment to have as much
effect in forum II as it would have in forum I.
The third possibility is that forum II might have a broader concept of preclusion than does forum I. Could forum II then give greater preclusive effect to the forum I judgment than does that forum?
This problem raises a fundamental question concerning the full
faith and credit concept; that is, whether the constitutional clause,
and by analogy the statutory provision, requires precisely the same
treatment of the judgment in forum II as that which would be given
in forum I.
Although full faith and credit has been considered in a number
of cases involving preclusion, the impact of the concept has never
been spelled out. Apparently, the initial judgment must, at a minimum, be given at least as much effect in the second forum as it
would be given in the rendering forum. 51 On the other hand, the
decisions have not clearly spelled out whether the court in forum II
can give more effect to the judgment than is demanded by the full
faith and credit provision. The language in a recent decision by the
Supreme Court certainly suggests that the second court could give
more effect to the first judgment than would forum I: "Full faith
and credit ... generally requires every State to give to a judgment
at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be ac50. See cases cited note 17 supra.
51. See In re Potts, 142 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 868
(1945); Maager v. Hoye, 122 F. Supp. 932, 934 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Butler v. Butler, 253
Iowa 1084, 1106, 114 N.W.2d 595, 608 (1962); Phillips v. Cooper, 253 Iowa ll59, ll63,
122 N.W.2d 317, 319 (1961).
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corded in the State which rendered it." 112 This statement was dictum
in the case; nevertheless it does suggest that the door is open for
forum II to give greater effect to a judgment than would the rendering state.153
Probably the best analogy to the situation under consideration
is the statute of limitations problem. In a long line of cases, both
federal and state courts have decided that they will enforce a judgment of forum I even though the statute of limitations governing
enforcement of judgments has run in forum I if the statute of limitations has not run on the action on the judgment in forum II when
the action is brought there.54 Justice Jackson has criticized this line
of authority and its underlying distinction between pleas to the merits
and pleas to the remedy, the latter of which are governed by the law
of the forum: "Distinguishing between denial of a right and denial
of a remedy is a rather academic enterprise and not a thoroughly
satisfying one. But on that basis it is held that a suit upon a judgment is subject to the statute of limitations of the forum state, rather
than to that of the rendering state. " 155
Broadly speaking, however, the problem under consideration is
simply whether a court can give more effect to a judgment than is
required by the Constitution or the statute. This question has
been answered affirmatively in other factual contexts. In Allis v.
Allis56 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, exercising diversity
52. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (emphasis added).
53. The same suggestion is found in Jackson, supra note 18, at 30, where the Justice
stated:
Private international law and the law of conflicts extend recognition to foreign
statutes or judgments by rules developed by a free forum as a matter of enlightened self-interest. The constitutional provision extends recognition on the basis
of the interests of the federal union which supersedes freedom of individual state
action by a compulsory policy of reciprocal rights to demand and obligations to
render faith and credit. States under their voluntary policy may extend recognition when they could not constitutionally be required to do so• .•. [Emphasis supplied.]
54. See Union Nat'! Bauk v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 46 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part):
f'Wlhere the enforcement of a judgment by State A is sought in State B, which
a longer limitation period than State A, State B is plainly free to enter its own
judgment upon the basis of State A's original judgment, even though that judgment would no longer be enforceable in State A. If enforcement of State B's new
judgment is then sought in State A, State A cannot refuse to enforce it without
violating the principle that the State where enforcement of a judgment is sought
cannot look behind the judgment. That was the situation in Roche v. McDonald,
275 U.S. 449, and so we there held.
Accord, Webb v. Webb, 222 N.C. 551, 23 S.E.2d 897 (1943); Fanton v. Middlebrook,
50 Conn. 44 (1882); Miller v. Brenham, 68 N.Y. 83 (1877); Taylor v. Joor, 7 La. Ann.
272 (1852); Succession of Ducker, 10 La. Ann. 758 (1855); Estes v. Kyle, 19 Tenn. 35
(1838).
55. Jackson, supra note 18, at 9 (footnote omitted).
56. 378 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 95!1 (1967).
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jurisdiction, was faced with a preclusion argument involving a
Nevada divorce decree which purportedly affected certain real
property in Texas. The federal court considered the problem of a
court attempting to affect real property in another state and examined the Texas law on the point, noting that:
[A] number of state courts have chosen to recognize the validity of
unexecuted equitable decrees, apparently upon the theory that the
situs state is no more deprived of exclusive jurisdiction over its
realty by implementing such decrees than by according Full Faith
and Credit to deeds actually executed under foreign court orders.57
The court quoted a Texas decision concerning this problem:
Comity, in the absence of a controlling decision by the United States
Supreme Court under the "Full Faith and Credit" clause, seems the
preferable basis for a state court decision.
Our holding therefore is that as a matter of comity we will
enforce the equitable decrees of a sister state affecting Texas land
so long as such enforcement does hot contravene an established
public policy in this State.58
Thus, the final conclusion was that the court would recognize the
binding effect of the Nevada decree although this was not required
by the Constitution.
As noted earlier, it seems reasonable to predict that federal courts
will wish to apply the doctrine of preclusion as broadly as possible
in the future. This means that the concept of full faith and credit,
even if applicable, will have no effect on the actions of the federal
courts unless it requires precisely the same treatment which would
be given to a judgment in the rendering court. If the clause establishes only a minimutn, which seems to be the case, its impact on
the problem under consideration will be minimal. 59
It must be recognized, however, that there may be serious constitutional objections to extending the preclusive effect of a judgment beyond that which would be given in the rendering forum.
In the matter of claim preclusion,60 for example, it might be argued
very persuasively that the litigant suing in forum I had no reason
57. 378 F.2d at 724.
58. 378 F.2d at 724.
59. Federal courts have held a state judgment preclusive under a very liberal concept of the doctrine without considering the law of preclusion of the state where the
judgment was rendered. In such cases it would seem that the federal court may well
be giving more preclusive effect than would the courts of the rendering state. See,
e.g., Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960); Hyman v. Regen•
stein, 258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cen. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
60. See example B supra.
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to believe that he would subsequently be unable to litigate a matter
which was only a related claim in that forum. To hold that he cannot recover in forum II because he is splitting his claim seems to be
highly questionable and could be viewed as depriving the litigant
of his related claim without due process of law. 61 On the other hand,
this argument would have little force when applied to a question
of issue preclusion if the losing party had the opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue fully in the first action. Due process
considerations should not prevent forum II from holding the losing
party bound on the issue when its public policy leads to this result.

E. Federal Interest
A federal interest apart from full faith and credit may obviously
be controlling in certain cases involving preclusion, and the law
applied in such cases will be that established by federal courts. A
classic example of this situation is The Evergreens v. Nunan, 62
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In that
case forum I was the Tax Court and forum II was the Court of
Appeals on appeal from a different suit in the Tax Court. The controversy involved only federal taxation; by no stretc;h of the imagination could it be said that state law was controlling. Another case in
which the federal interest was clearly dominant is Williamson v.
Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 63 where both forums were federal
and the litigation involved the antitrust law. The court properly
applied its own concept of preclusion/res judicata in ruling that
the first judgment barred the second suit because of claim preclusion.64
61. However, in the analogous situation in which the repeal or amendment of a
statutory provision forecloses a claim that has not been reduced to judgment, the
courts have generally held that retroactive application of the statute is not a denial
of due process. E.g., in Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266, 270-71 (6th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 902 (1949), the court stated:
Plaintiffs contend that their causes of action are founded upon rights vested in
them and protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which cannot be disturbed. We think plaintiffs' rights were not "vested i:ights" in the sense
contended ••••
The plaintiffs' causes of action are not founded altogether simply upon contract executed by the free consent and agreement of the parties thereto. The
contracts were based upon subject matter in respect to which Congress had
authority to legislate; and did not establish fixed rights of either present or future enjoyment. . . . The proposition that their rights granted by the Congress
under the commerce clause could not be taken away by congressional legislation
under the same clause, is self-contradictory.
See also Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, rehearing denied, 325 U.S.
896 (1945); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville &: Nashville R. Co., 258 U.S.
13 (1922).
62. 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). But see Hyman v.
Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
63. 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
64. Similar results have been reached in Jones v. United States, 228 F.2d 52 (D.C.
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Regardless of the basis of jurisdiction in the second federal court
action, some courts have indicated that an earlier judgment by a
federal court raises a federal question concerning the preclusive
effect of the prior decision. 615 This theory was rather tentatively
advanced by the district court for the Southern District of New
York in Sherman v. Jacobson. 66 The court asked:
Thus, is the effect to be given the judgment of a federal court in
Iowa determined by the full faith and credit concept or by the fact
that all federal courts are components of a single judicial system?
... If full faith is to be given, must the res judicata effect of the Iowa
judgment be determined by federal or Iowa law? What law governs
on the question of election of remedies? 67
When this case was cited in a later opinion, the question marks had
been dropped. In Miller v. Steinbach, 68 the same court stated:
Whether the effect to be given the Pennsylvania District Court
dismissal is based upon the full faith and credit clause ... or upon
the doctrine that "all federal courts are components of a single judicial system," Sherman v. Jacobson ... the decision ... must be recognized if valid. 69
This statement is a recognition of the involvement of the federal
system in the law of preclusion to be applied by the federal courts.
This analysis, of course, applies only to the federal court-federal
court situation.
Cir. 1955); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 340
U.S. 865 (1950); Sarelas v. Sheehan, 353 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1965) (claim preclusion);
Adriaanse v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 384 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1967) (same federal
court in both proceedings; the first was criminal prosecution); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &: Pacific R.R., 380 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1967). See also Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures
Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 931 (1954).
In Zdanok Y. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964), the court stated:
Since both the Zdanok and Alexander actions present questions of federal
law, we are free to follow our own conceptions as to the effect of the judgment in
the former on the latter ••• and need not decide whether this would also be true
if federal jurisdiction in either or both actions rested on diversity alone.
This statement was made although the federal courts in both cases were exercising
diversity jurisdiction.
65. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Mathews
v. ·New York Racing Ass'n, 193 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (apparent application of
some federal principle of res judicata/ preclusion; no reference made to the law of the
state); A. EHRENZWEIG, ·CONFLICT OF LAws, 167 (1962): "As between federal courts sitting in different states an apparently extraconstitutional doctrine of res judicata has
.been held to apply with the same effect."
66. 247 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
67. 247 F. Supp. at 266 n.21.
68. 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
69. 268 F. Supp. at 283.
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In both federal and nonfederal litigation in the federal courts
since Erie, there has been a recognized line of authority demanding
the recognition of a federal interest in deciding the law to be applied.
Sibbach v. Wilson b Co.,70 the Byrd case,71 and Hanna v. Plumer72
all emphasize an overriding federal interest in the administration
of the federal judicial system. It should be noted in passing that each
of these cases was a diversity action which supposedly required the
application of the substantive law of the states, and in each case
the Supreme Court held that federal law should be applied.
One of the countervailing federal considerations which was attacked in the courts and emerged victorious is the right to trial by
jury as established by the long practice in the federal courts. Where
there is a clash between the gloss of Erie-conformance in all outcome-affecting matters, even if traditionally labeled procedural-and
the federal concept of trial by jury, the former must give way to the
latter. This is the lesson of the Byrd case. Beyond this, there are
other countervailing considerations which, it is suggested, might
require a federal court to forgo conformance with the law of the
forum state and apply federal case law. Since the mode of analysis
seems to be a weighing process, these countervailing considerations
are simply factors to be considered. They are not absolutes that
determine conclusively the law to be applied.
The dominance of federal concepts-in discovery matters, in
docket control, in the rules of evidence, in the right of the judge to
comment on the evidence, in the matter of trial by jury-suggests
a broad undergirding federal policy. All of these aspects of the
federal trial process seem to reflect a desire to provide a speedy
adjudication on the merits in the best possible manner. These factors suggest that "trial according to federal standards" and the best
federal traditions is a countervailing consideration to be weighed by
the federal courts in choosing the law that will decide a controversy.
The concept of federal trial standards includes a desire to reach a
decision based not on a technicality, but rather on the rights of the
parties. It also includes a wish to move forward in the matter of
procedural reform. In the classical analysis, each of these considerations is a procedural matter or one that might properly be labeled a
matter of judicial administration. None could be called substantive.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Hanna case
70. !112 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 655 (1941).
71. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., ll56 U.S. 525, rehearing
denied, !157 U.S. 9llll (1958).
72. !ISO U.S. 460 (1965).
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indicated an analytical process for deciding the law to be applied.
The Court stated:
It is doubtful that, even if there were no Federal Rule making it
clear that in-hand service is not required in diversity actions, the
Erie rule would have obligated the District Court to follow the
Massachusetts procedure. "Outcome-determination" analysis was
never intended to serve as a talisman. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative • . • • Indeed, the message of York itself is that choices between
state and federal law are to be made not by application of any automatic "litmus paper" criterion, but rather by reference to the
policies underlying the Erie rule....
The "outcome-determination" test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws.73
For the purposes of this balancing process, it would seem that another federal interest, possibly overriding, might well be the best
use of the time of the federal judges. In view of the enormous docket
loads of the federal courts,74 one might well conclude that the federal
courts must consider the wise use of the judges' time to be of paramount importance. If this is true, the law of preclusion, which
serves to bar unnecessary litigation, would be of great concern to
the federal courts and this particular federal interest may be overriding regardless of whether the court handing down the first judgment was a state or federal court. 75
A similar means of reaching the same result is suggested by the
cases which indicate that preclusion/res judicata is a matter of
"judicial administration" in the federal courts. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in Hoffman v. Blaski, restated this concept:
A general principle of judicial administration in the federal courts
is at stake.
. . . I am at a loss to appreciate why all the considerations bearing on the good administration of justice which underlie the technical doctrine of res judicata did not apply here to require the
Court of Appeals ... to defer to the previous decision. . . . One
would suppose that these considerations would be especially important in enforcing comity among federal courts of equal authority. 76
73. 380 U.S. at 466-68.
74. There were 6,227 more civil cases pending in federal district courts in the
United States on June 30, 1965, than on June 30, 1958. See 1965 ANN. REP. OF THE
DIREcroR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 174, Table C-1
(1966); 1958 ANN. REP. OF Tim DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 158, table C-1 (1959).
75. See Penn v. Rinaldi, 323 F.2d 91!1 (2d Cir. 1963); Kern v. Hettinger, !10!1 F.2d
!133 (2d Cir. 1962); notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
76. 363 U.S. 335, 345, 348-49 (1960) (dissent).
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Arguing for preclusion/res judicata, Justice Frankfurter contin•
ued: "Nor does such a view of right and wise judicial administration depend upon the nature of the procedural or even jurisdictional
issue in controversy. Technically, res judicata controls even a decision on a matter of true jurisdiction." 77 There seems to be general
agreement that matters of judicial administration do not fall under
the Erie rule and that the federal courts can articulate their own
rules in such matters.7 8 This may be simply another way of saying
that the federal interests are overriding.
It should also be noted that federal judgments can be registered
in districts other than that in which the judgment was rendered.
Under section 1963 of the Judicial Code,79 the registered judgment
has "the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district
where registered." The precise effect of registration is not clear;
certainly the preclusive/res judicata effect of a registered judgment
has not been considered. 80 It seems, however, that the right of regis77. !16!! U.S. at !150.
78. IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrICE 'if 0.317[8] (2d ed. 1961):
There are numerous other areas • • • which have traditionally been considered to
be matters of procedure or to involve judicial administration and would, therefore, fall outside the scope of the Erie doctrine••••
The weight of federal decisions indicates that labels are not determinative and
that the application of the Erie doctrine depends on whether the matter under
consideration will substantially affect the outcome of the litigation. But in the interest of uniform procedure and in preventing a whittling away of that uni•
formity, he who would challenge the validity of a particular provision in the
Federal Rules should bear the burden of clearly showing that its application could
prevent him from obtaining the same substantial treatment that he would obtain
in the same court.
In Zaroff v. Holmes, 379 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1967) the court was faced with the
question of the preclusive effect to be given a dismissal under local rule for failure
to appear at a pretrial hearing. The court considered this a matter under i~ control
and held that dismissal would not be given preclusive effect.
79. 28 u.s.c. § 196!! (1964).
80. In Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir, 1965), the court considered a registered judgment and concluded that the statute of limitations of the state where
registered controlled rather than that of the originally rendering state. In the course
of the opinion the court stated:
We have concluded that § 196!! is more than "ministerial" and is more than
a mere procedural device for the collection of the foreign judgment. We feel that
registration provides, so far as enforcement is concerned, the equivalent of a new
judgment of the registration court. • ••
• • • If registration is to "have the same effect as a judgment," it must, for our
present enforcement purposes, mean just that and not something else, .••
We note by way of caveat that § 196!! presents much to be answered in the
future. Does the statute's "same effect" language apply for all purposes and em•
brace no exception? Does the registration court have power, under Rule 60, F.R.
Civ. P., to correct the registered judgment? • • • Is a registered judgment itself
subject to registration elsewhere? May a registered judgment be revived by a later
reregistration? Is a registered judgment subject to every attack which could be
raised in an action on that judgment, such as fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and the
like? Is § 196!! the equivalent of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
~ct even though the latter is much more detailed in its provisions? N:ust full
faith and credit be given to a registered judgment? The presence of thc,se and
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tration suggests the existence of federal power over judgments
rendered by the federal courts. By analogy, it can be urged that the
federal government should have similar power over the preclusive/
res judicata effect of such judgments.
Another argument in favor of federal standards can be derived
from the current trend in conflicts of law, which indicates that the
law to be applied is that of the forum which has the most significant
relationship to the issue before the court.81 This is simply another
way of recognizing that the applicable law can be derived from
different sources according to the interests of the various jurisdictions
in the matter before the court. When one recognizes the great interest which a forum has in the size of its docket load and in the
use of its judges' time, and when the effect which the law of preclusion has on these matters is considered, it is easy to conclude that
the forum's law should be applied to matters of preclusion, or at
least that a federal court should seriously consider applying some
federal rule unless there is a constitutional limitation which bars
such application.82
F. Summary
There are thus a number of factors which must be weighed in
determining the law to be applied to a claim of preclusion in a
federal court. It is impossible to look to a single factor to decide the
question; there must be a weighing process involving various considerations. This synthesis includes pursuit of the goals enunciated
in Erie-avoidance of inequitable administration of the law and the
prevention of forum-shopping. It also necessitates consideration of

•

undoubtedly many other questions prompts us to emphasize that the conclusion
we reach here is one having application to the fact situation of this case. We do
not now go so far as to say that registration effects a new judgment in the registra, tion court for every conceivable purpose; neither do we say that it fails to do so
for any particular purpose.
Id. at 268, 270-71.
This provision for registration of judgments suggests that Congress intends that any
federal judgments may be given "the same effect" as a judgment rendered in the
court of registration. This seems to be "full faith and credit" in reverse. Instead of
having the effect that would be given in the state of rendition, this provision equates
foreign federal court judgments with judgments rendered by the local federal court.
Although the preclusive effect of registration has not been considered, it would seem
that the statutory provision is another attempt to unify the federal courts and thus
militates in favor of a uniform law of preclusion throughout the federal system.
81. See H. GOODRICH &: E. SCOLES, supra note 14.
82. A distinction should be drawn between deciding the law to be applied and a
determination of the jurisdiction of the court over persons. As the Supreme Court
stated in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958), the Florida court "does not acquire that jurisdiction [over the person] by· being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal
jurisdiction, not choice of law."
·
·
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the desire for a meaningful federalism which is promoted by full
faith and credit and of the interest in a federal court system operating at maximum efficiency. Moreover, the federal courts in deciding
the law to be applied obviously must act within the framework of
the Constitution. They cannot apply a preclusive rule that would
deprive a litigant of his property without due process; and, they
must give litigants equal protection. 83 Within these limitations, the
federal courts have a great deal of freedom to decide cases in the
manner that will maximize the return which society gets from the
judicial system. The following illustrative applications of the foregoing analysis serve to demonstrate how these various factors may be
employed to reach a decision in specific cases.
III.

SPECIFIC .APPLICATIONS

A. Courts and Jurisdiction
In deciding the preclusive effect of a judgment in a federal court,
it is necessary to consider the adjudicating bodies involved and the
nature of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court. These
variables may be charted as follows:
Forum I
1.
2.
3.
4.

Federal Court
State Court
Federal Court
State Court

Forum II
Federal
Federal
Federal
Federal

Court
Court
Court
Court

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
of Forum II
Federal Question
Federal Question
Diversity Jurisdiction
Diversity Jurisdiction

For purposes of discussion, it will be assumed the use of preclusion
would not violate due process or deny any litigant equal protection
of the laws.
In the first listed situation, there is no need to consider Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins since the federal court in forum II is exercising
federal question jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has noted, "It
has been held in non-diversity cases, since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
that the federal courts will apply their own rule of res judicata." 84
There is no full faith and credit problem since the first court is
a federal court and it is reasonable to conclude that the relationship
of federal courts involves something other than full faith and
credit, 85 even though there is some authority to the contrary.86 Here
83. See Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. REv.
3!1, 47-56 (1963).
84-. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733, rehearing denied, 328 U.S. 879 (1946).
85. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir.
194-1).
86. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-, 526
(19!11):
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the federal interests are clearly controlling, and the federal courts
should apply federally created law regarding preclusion. 87
ln the second listed possibility, Erie again has no application.
The federal full faith and credit statute may have some application
in establishing the minimum effect to be given the judgment rendered by the state court, but apparently it does not limit the preelusive effect to be given. 88
In the third situation, injecting diversity jurisdiction poses a
problem. At this point it may be argued that Erie controls and that
the law of the state in which the federal court is sitting should
govern. 89 As in the first hypothetical, statutory full faith and credit
does not apply; moreover, there are-as this Article has suggestedcountervailing considerations which militate in favor of the application of federal law. The courts involved are both federal and therefore it is logical to say that the relationship between the two should
be governed by federal law.90
In the fourth situation, Erie again is an important consideration.
There is a possibility that only a single state may have an interest in
the litigation. If this is so, it can be argued that the federal court is
sitting as another court of the state, and thus that the federal involvement is minimal.91 On the other hand, the judgment claimed to be
preclusive may have been rendered by a court sitting in a state
other than that in which the federal court is sitting. When this occurs
there are definite muti-state involvements, and more reason for looking to the federal courts for the law to be applied. 92 The statutory
full faith and credit provision probably does apply, but in any event
the statute apparently does not limit the federal court if it wished to
go further than the rendering state in giving preclusive effect to the
earlier judgment.98
Assuming that all of the considerations discussed to this point
have been properly weighed, the court must examine the nature of
[T]he full faith and credit required by that (Constitutional) clause is not involved
since neither of the courts concerned was a state court.
While this Court has never been called upon to determine the specific question
here raised, several federal courts have held the judgment res judicata in like
circumstances.••• And we are in accord with this view.
87. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
88. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 23-40 supra.
90. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. The interest of the federal courts in
docket control should not be forgotten.
·
92. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 45-58 supra and accompanying text.
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the adjudicating bodies which are involved in greater detail. It has
been concluded that when a party urges issue preclusion, the body
ruling on the matter should consider (I) the nature of the body
handing down the decision which supposedly precludes consideration and (2) the nature of the body then hearing the controversy.
Under some circumstances a court may not be bound by another
court's earlier adjudication of a fact issue, and the reason given is
that the second court has a special competency with regard to the
issue involved.114 It is said that the legislature has granted certain
judicial power-including the sole authority to make certain decisions-to the specific court and that that court should not be
bound by an adjudication made by another court which could not
rule on the litigation involved. The second adjudicating body must
examine its own status to assess whether this argument is applicable
to the case before it. While this sort of argument may be persuasive
in the case of special federal question jurisdiction,91' or when the
federal court is acting with its special competency to determine
constitutional questions in habeas corpus proceedings,96 it is hard
to see any special justification for relitigation of matters in an ordinary diversity case.
The first adjudicating body must also be examined to see what
decisional processes were used. The second court must be satisfied
that the interests of the party being precluded were adequately protected; specifically, there must have been adequate incentive and
opportunity to litigate the issue fully before a body which used acceptable procedures. If these requirements are met, then preclusive
effect may be given to the decision. There are
cases in which the courts have declined to apply the doctrine because
of certain deficiencies in the earlier proceedings. The common factor
in most of those cases seems to have been that the second court was
of the opinion that the first court and the proceedings in it were of
such a character that it could not be reasonably said that the parties
had been afforded a full and fair hearing 0£ the issues. The desirability for such a limitation in the application of the doctrine seems
obvious ....97

Only if the involved adjudicating bodies are discriminatingly
94. See Vestal, Preclusion/Res ]udicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO.
L.J. 857, 885-89 (1966).
95. See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 825 (1955).
96. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1963); Coley v. Alvis, MI F.2d 870 (6th
Cir. 1967).
97. William Whitman Co. v. Universaf Oil Pr6ducts, 92 F. Supp. 885, 889 (D. Del.
1950).

1748

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:1723

considered along with other variables will the forum be able to make
the correct ruling on a claim of preclusion.98

B. Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion
One of the significant variables which should affect the choice
of law to be applied is whether claim or issue preclusion is being
urged. Claim preclusion arises, for example, when the defendant
asserts that the claim which the plaintiff is attempting to bring in
forum II has previously been litigated to a final result by the same
parties in forum I. Forum II must then decide whether the claim
now being asserted is different from the claim in the first suit.99
The nature of the problem can be illustrated by a simple automobile accident. If the plaintiff sues for personal injury damages in
an Illinois state court and recovers, he can then sue for property
damages suffered in the accident and recover. In Illinois there are
two causes of action arising from the automobile accident. 100 If we
assume that the first suit was in an Illinois state court and the second
is in a federal court, the source of preclusive law to be applied becomes important. Assuming diversity jurisdiction, if the second suit
is in an Illinois federal court it would seem that that court would be
required to apply Illinois law on the point. Any other conclusion
would be an outrage. If the federal court hearing the second suit
is in another state-such as Iowa-where there is only one cause of
action arising from an automobile accident, then there are different
considerations. Could the federal court in Iowa conclude that the
plaintiff is barred because of the earlier suit in Illinois? It would
seem that the answer should be no, and two reasons might be given.
First, it would be unreasonable to bar the plaintiff from recovery
for the property loss suffered, since the action could be brought in
Illinois and the plaintiff had no reason to believe that the first judgment would bar the second recovery. Second, barring the plaintiff
may deprive him of his property claim-which was not involved in
the first suit under the Illinois law-without due process of law. 101
Issue preclusion, where the party had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the issue fully, seems to be a different matter.
If the litigant was aware of the seriousness of the litigation, he can
hardly claim that he has been misled or surprised. _It would thus
98. St:e Vestal, supra note 94 at 890.
99. See, e.g., Towle v. Boeing Airplane Co., 364 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1966).
100. See note 9 supra.
IOI. Obviously the plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate the entire controversy in
the Illinois court and did not take it. This, however, would not seem to be controlling.
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seem reasonable to allow forum II to apply its own rules concerning
issue preclusion.
C. Substantive Law

If the analysis thus far is accepted, the federal courts will have
many opportunities to decide preclusion questions according to their
mvn concepts of what is right and proper. The analysis also suggests that under certain circumstances the federal courts will not
have this freedom; specifically, this will be true in the one-state
diversity cases102 and in those situations involving claim preclusion
which may be controlled by constitutional concepts. 103 In addition,
the weighing process which is suggested may result in a court's
deciding to apply the law of a specific state. Generally, however, it
seems that the federal courts have the freedom to create their own
law in the area of preclusion. This means that the federal courts
will have to consider the parties involved, 104 the issues involved,1° 5
the caliber of the court rendering the first decision,106 and whether
some egregious error has been committed.107 In the case of claim
preclusion, the possible justification for bringing the second suit
will have to be examined. 108 These and many other matters of preclusion will have to be faced and decided. These problems, however,
may be decided in federal terms with federal factors being considered.

IV.

PROJECTION

The law of preclusion is in a state of flux at the present time.
Principles which could be stated with assurance a decade ago are
102. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
103. See text accompanying notes 41-61 supra.
104. See Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. R.Ev. 27
(1964).
105. See Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature of the Controversy,
1965 WASH. U.L. REv. 158.
106. See Vestal, note 94 supra.
107. The courts have considered this matter only rarely. Obviously, if a fraud has
been perpetrated on a court by a litigant, then relief is available in the rendering
court. A somewhat different problem is posed when the litigants have not been party
to the fraud and the court has handed down an erroneous ruling. Can the litigants
rely on the adjudication, or is it subject to attack? A classic case is the disappearing
husband whose wife collects on an insurance policy claiming that her husband is dead.
When the husband then reappears, is the insurance company bound or will the court
note that the husband is alive? See New York L~fe Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co.,
178 Tenn. 437, 159 S.W.2d 81 (1942) (successful action ~gainst the insurance company) and the later case, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co., 200 Tenn.
513, 292 S.W.2d 749 (1956) (allowing the insurance company relief; two concurring
opinions and two dissenting opinions).
108. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62
Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 357 (1967).
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subject to attack at the present time, and many of these principles
will be rejected almost unanimously by the turn of the century.109
The public is getting impatient with game-playing in the courts.
The extensive use of discovery procedures to minimize gamesmanship in the trial of law suits is similar to the developments in the
area of preclusion.
In the federal courts there has been uncertainty about the law
of preclusion to be applied. At the same time, there has been almost
a total unawareness of the confusion, or at least a failure to acknowledge the existence of the confusion. Individual federal courts have
simply adopted one theory and applied it without recognizing
competing theories.
In the next decade the federal courts must face up to the question of the law to be applied and recognize that what is required is
a weighing process through which a number of different considerations are examined. There is no single governing criterion. Certainly the federal courts are not tied completely to the law of the
states; other sources can be considered.
In the long run, it would seem highly probable that the federal
courts will recognize the overriding interests of the federal judiciary
in the doctrine of preclusioh/res judicata. The expeditious handling
of the business of the federal courts requires the use of a vital,
growing concept of preclusion. This would suggest that the federal
courts should maximize the use of this concept. Second, the federal
courts traditionally have been in the forefront of the fight for better
judicial administration; this also calls for the extensive use of preclusion.110 Anything less would be an abdication of the federal
courts' leadership role. In sum, the next phase of the development
of the law of preclusion in the federal courts should see an expansion of its use, a recognition of the great federal interest in the preelusive law applicable in the federal courts, and, as a consequence,
the creation or recognition of a uniform law of preclusion generally
applicable in the federal courts.
109. For a more liberal approach to the problems of preclusion, see, e.g., Maryland
v. Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 298, 303 (D. Md. 1967) ("This court looks with favor
on the modem trends in this area."): Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298
(D. Mass. 1960).
110. In at least two cases, the courts have inferentially warned litigants that the
rules of res judicata/preclusion 111ay be changing, Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd.
v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 979 (Ct. CI. 1967), and Berner v. British Commonwealth
Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d li32, 540-41 (2d Cir, 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983
(1966).

